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CHAPTER 29 
State and Municipal Government 
JOSEPH C. DUGGAN 
A. STATE GOVERNMENT 
§29.I. The Boston Common Garage Authority. The lack of park-
ing facilities in Boston prompted the General Court to enact Acts 
of 1957, c. 701, providing for construction and operation of a garage 
for the parking of motor vehicles under Boston Common and the 
creation of a public instrumentality to be known as the Boston Com-
mon Garage Authority. The primary function of the authority is 
to construct and operate, without cost to the city, a garage for the 
parking and servicing of motor vehicles under Boston Common. 
Seven men, consisting of the Commissioner of Parks of the city, 
the Commissioner of Real Property of the city, and the chairman of 
the Boston Traffic Commission, and four other members appointed 
by the mayor will constitute the authority, and will serve without 
compensation. The authority, in addition to being authorized to 
adopt by-laws, to establish rules and regulations for the use of the 
garage, etc., is also empowered to acquire and hold such interest in 
the lands constituting Boston Common and in Charles Street as it 
may deem necessary. The cost of the garage will be paid by the is-
suance of revenue bonds of the authority, which will have all the 
qualities and incidents of negotiable instruments, and the proceeds 
of which are to be used solely for the payment of the cost of the 
garage. 
This act, similar to the one establishing the Massachusetts Port 
Authority,l is subject to the same principal criticism. The purchasers 
of these bonds have very little security other than the provision that 
while any bonds remain outstanding, the powers, duties or existence 
of the authority will not be impaired in any way that will affect ad-
versely the interests and rights of the holders. The only other security 
afforded the investing public is that the authority may secure the 
bonds by a trust agreement which can allow the authority to pledge 
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§29.1. 1 Acts of 1956. c. 465. discussed in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §18.1.· 
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or assign its revenues but not to conveyor mortgage the garage, its 
extensions or any of its parts. As in the Port Authority bill, the reve-
nue bonds are not deemed to constitute a debt of the Commonwealth 
and are therefore payable solely from revenues. The only attractive 
feature of these bonds is that income from them is free from taxation 
by the Commonwealth. 
When all bonds issued under this act are paid or a sufficient amount 
for the payment thereof has been set aside, the garage and other 
facilities will become the property of the city of Boston and the au-
thority will be dissolved. 
§29.2. Public school teachers: Salaries and inspection of records. 
During the SURVEY year several changes to G.L., c. 71 were enacted. 
The first sentence of §40 was amended to provide that the compensa-
tion of teachers employed in public day schools will be at a rate of 
not less than $3300 for the school year;! §42B was amended by insert-
ing §42C permitting teachers in cities or town where school officials 
keep records of teachers' work to inspect these records.2 
§29.3. Removal of vehicles from state highways. General Laws, 
c. 85, §2A has provided that the Department of Public Works may 
remove to the nearest convenient place any vehicle interfering with 
snow and ice removal operations. The scope of the section was con-
siderably broadened by Acts of 1957, c. 338 to give the Department 
the power to remove cars interfering with the free flow of traffic on 
state highways. 
§29.4. Renewal and redevelopment projects. G.L., c. 121, dealing 
with low-rent housing projects and redevelopment authorities, under-
went a series of changes during the SURVEY year. A change made to 
§26CCI increased the total amount of indebtedness that a city or town 
may incur for federally aided housing projects or renewal or re-
development projects, from an amount not to exceed 1 percent of 
the average of the assessors' valuations of its taxable property for the 
three preceding years to an amount not to exceed 2 percent of this 
average. 
Section 26QQ, prior to the 1957 change,2 created in each city and 
town in the Commonwealth, except Boston, a public instrumentality 
to ,be known as the "Redevelopment Authority." The amendment 
provided for the establishment of such an authority in the city of 
Boston. The new amendment also made it unnecessary for the "Re-
development Authority" to get the consent of the housing authority 
prior to the transaction of any business; a certificate of organization 
from the State Secretary is all that is now necessary. 
The term "blighted open area" in the statute was redefined by 1957 
§29.2. 1 Acts of 1957. c. 447. 
2 Id .• c. 195. 
§29.4. 1 Acts of 1957. c. 613. This section had been previously amended by Acts 
of 1957. c. 106. striking the words "one half of" before the words "one per cent." 
2 Id .• c. 150. 
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legislations to include "any predominantly open area which is ... un-
duly costly to develop ... soundly through the ordinary operations of 
private enterprise and which is to be developed for residential, rec-
reational, commercial or industrial purposes .... " The definition as 
it stood prior to the amendment did not include areas which were to 
be developed for recreational, commercial or industrial purposes and 
was limited solely to areas with "predominantly residental purposes." 
§29.5. Award of contracts for public buildings. Acts of 1957, c. 
590 amended G.L., c. 149, §44A to provide that every contract for 
the construction, alteration, repair, etc. of any public building, esti-
mated to cost more than $5000 in the case of the Commonwealth or 
more than $2000 in the case of any other governmental unit will be 
awarded to the lowest responsible and eligible general bidder within 
a period of thirty days, Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays ex-
cluded, after approval by the federal government if it is a contract 
requiring this approval. The award period, therefore, was shortened 
from thirty-five days to the present thirty days exclusive of Saturdays, 
Sundays and holidays. 
General Laws, c. 149, §§44K and 44C were amended by the same 
act. Section 44K is the enforcement section whereby the Department 
of Labor and Industries is given the necessary powers to require com-
pliance with the statute, including the power to institute and prose-
cute proceedings in the Superior Court. The amendment provides 
that the Department is not required to pay any entry fee in connec-
tion with the institution of enforcement proceedings. Section 44C 
was amended to require that a subcontractor install materials to be 
furnished by him except those which are not customary for him to 
install under his current trade practices and the installation of which 
is required by another section of the specifications. 
B. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 
§29.6. Zoning by-laws: Jurisdiction. Whether the board of alder-
men had jurisdiction to grant a variance under a city ordinance pur-
porting to give the board that power was the controlling issue pre-
sented in Colabufalo v. Board of Appeal of the City of Newton.1 The 
land in question was in a private residence district in which the build-
ing described in the building permit issued by the board of aldermen 
was not permitted. Prior to the issuance of the permit, the board of 
aldermen purported to grant a variance for the construction of the 
building. Previously, in Massachusetts Feather Co. v. Aldermen of 
Chelsea,2 the Supreme Court determined that an appeal to the board 
of aldermen was invalid and consequently their action was without 
jurisdiction and a nullity. The Court in the instant case ruled that 
SId., c. 613. 
§29.6. 11957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 861. 143 N.E.2d 536. 
2331 Mass. 527. 529-530, 120 N.E.2d 766. 767-768 (1954). 
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the board of aldermen had no power to grant variances and that 
the provision of the ordinance which purported to give the board 
that power conflicted with the enabling statute; furthermore, statutory 
provisions for granting of variances by the boards of appeal are pre-
cise, completeS and occupy the field.4 
In the case of Town of Concord v. Attorney General5 petitions for 
writs of mandamus and certiorari were brought praying that the 
order of the Attorney General, disapproving a purported amendment 
to a provision of the zoning by-law of the town, "be revoked ab initio, 
quashed and expunged." The Court, in dismissing the petition for 
a writ of certiorari, quoted from Attorney General v. Suffolk County 
Apportionment Commissioners6 in which it was said that "Mandamus 
affords the appropriate form of relief. It is the remedy to which resort 
usually is had to set aside the illegal performance of duty and to com-
pel the performance of duty according to law .... " 7 The Attorney 
General's contention in this case was that G.L., c. 40, § 32, reading 
"[b]efore a by-law takes effect it shall be approved by the attorney 
general ... ," gave him the power of approval, the exercise of which 
was final and beyond judicial review. The Court disposed of this 
contention by saying that the acts are not within an area of unreview-
able discretion 8 and that if the power to nullify a by-law ever resided 
in the Attorney General the power did not survive the enactment of 
Acts of 1952, c. 337. 
The use of ambiguous terminology in zoning by-laws and statutes 
has given rise to considerable litigation. In City of Worcester v. New 
England Institute 9 the statute in issue was G.L., c. 40A, §2, which pro-
vided "that no ordinance or by-law which prohibits ... the use of land 
... for any educational purpose ... [which is] public ... shall be valid." 
The city zoning ordinance read in part as follows: "In any residence 
'A' district no building structure or lot shall be used ... in any part 
except for one or more of the following specified purposes: ... (6) 
Schools, ... " The question was raised if this ordinance exemption for 
schools should be confined solely to publicly supported institutions, 
in view of G.L., c. 40A, §2. Thus the Court had to decide if the Gen-
eral Court intended to limit the exemption to only those educational 
institutions for which public funds are spent. The Court held that 
since the promotion of education by non-profit institutions not main-
tained at public expense has been often asserted or recognized as 
a public purpose, it can be said that the New England Institute school 
3 Turner v. Board of Appeals of Milton, 305 Mass. 189, 192, 25 N.E.2d 203. 
204 (1940). 
4 G.L., c. 40A, §15. 
51957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 641. 142 N.E.2d 360. 
6224 Mass. 598, 113 N.E. 581 (1916). 
7224 Mass. at 609, 113 N.E. at 587. 
SAmes v. Attorney General, 332 Mass. 246, 124 N.E.2d 511 (1955); Howe v. 
Attorney General, 325 Mass. 268, 90 N.E.2d 316 (1950). 
9335 Mass. 486, 140 N.E.2d 470 (1957). 
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serves an educational purpose which is "public" within the meaning 
of the statute. 
The petitioner in Robinson v. Commonwealth,!o at a trial for the 
assessment of damages arising out of a taking by the Commonwealth, 
tried to establish that the zoning ordinances as applied to his land 
were invalid. The Court decided that attacks on the validity of the 
zoning by-laws should have been asserted by the petitioner in the 
Land Court under G.L., c. 240, §I4A or by suit for declaratory relief 
in the Superior Court under G.L., c. 231A. Thus, in petitions for land 
damages against the Commonwealth, zoning ordinances cannot be 
attacked.ll 
§29.7. Eminent domain: Injury to property without taking and 
right to damages. Two interesting eminent domain cases were heard 
this year, Webster Thomas Co. v. Commonwealth,! and Sullivan v. 
Commonwealth,2 in both of which the Court reiterated the principle 
that there can be no recovery under G.L., c. 79 for injuries caused 
to property not taken unless the statute authorizing the particular 
injury provides that the owner may recover the amount of the damage. 
In the Sullivan case, a petition for the assessment of damages under 
G.L., c. 79 was brought by petitioners for injuries caused to their 
house by rock blasting in the course of construction of an aqueduct. 
Although it is an almost invariable practice for the General Court, 
whenever it authorizes the infliction of damage to private property 
by a public improvement, to provide that the owner may recover the 
amount of the damage, not only was this practice not followed in 
the statute under which the aqueduct was built but the authorizing 
words went further and limited the application of Chapter 79 to "All 
takings under this act and all proceedings in relation to or growing 
out of same .... " Since the petition was neither in relation to nor 
growing out of a taking, there could not be any implication in the 
reference to Chapter 79 of an intention to authorize the recovery 
of damages for injuries to land not taken. The right to recover dam-
ages for injury to land not taken is not given expressly or by necessary 
implication in G.L., c. 79, §9,3 for it provides merely a procedure for 
these cases; it does not in itself create a liability for damages; that 
is left to the statute authorizi~g the injury. The case of Wine v. Com-
monwealth 4 can be distinguished from the Sullivan case since the 
authorizing statute provided for damages on account of any taking of 
or injury to land. 
10335 Mass. 630, 141 N.E.2d 727 (1957). 
11 Long Beach City High School District v. Steward, 30 Cal. 2d 763, 185 P.2d 585 
(1947). 
§29.7. 11957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 761, 143 N.E.2d 216. 
2335 Mass. 619, 142 N.E.2d 347 (1957). 
a G.L., c. 79, §9 provides: "When injury has been caused to the real estate of 
any person by ... construction ... of a public improvement which does not involve 
the taking of private property, ... damages shall be awarded ... " 
4 301 Mass. 451, 17 N.E.2d 545 (1938). 
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The Webster case also involved injury to property without taking. 
The injury was caused by the construction of a portion of the Boston 
Central Artery. The Commonwealth, in the demolition of the struc-
tures which it had taken, exposed the interior brick boundary walls 
of the petitioners' building; these walls would have buckled outward, 
unless tied in, because of the removal of the adjacent buildings. The 
Court permitted the petitioners to recover although the statute au-
thorizing this public improvement, as in the Sullivan case, did not 
provide for recovery except where there was a taking. At first blush, 
it might appear that the Court arrived at opposite conclusions in 
these two cases - the facts of which were somewhat similar - but this 
is not the case. The Court did not ground recovery upon G.L., c. 79 
since it does not purport to create a right to damages but merely defines 
the "measure" thereof. Recovery was permitted in the Webster case 
because the injury was caused by the laying out of a state highway. 
Therefore, the general statutory provision, G.L., c. 81, §7, permitted 
recovery; under §§7 and 7C of the chapter, the procedure of Chapter 
79 for the assessment of damages is made available. 
§29.8. Licenses: Sufficiency of notice. A notice reading: "You are 
herewith advised that under Chapter 140, Sec. 30 of the Gen. Laws 
of Massachusetts, a hearing will be held ... on complaints received 
by the Board [of Selectmen] as regards your operation of the premises 
known as 'Nantucket New Ocean House'" was alleged to be insuf-
ficient as a matter of law to support an action under the statute in the 
case of Manchester v. Selectmen of Nantucket.1 A license of the type 
here involved can be revoked or suspended by the licensing authori-
ties only after notice and hearing. The purpose of the notice is to in-
form the license holder with reasonable particularity of the charges 
that he will be called upon to meet at the hearing so that he can 
properly prepare his defense.2 The Court was of the opinion that 
the notice sent by the selectmen in the present case failed to inform 
the petitioner properly, and while these notices are not to be tested 
by the standards applicable to criminal pleading, fairness requires 
more than was contained in this notice. 
§29.9. Town finance: Necessity of appropriation before expendi-
ture. In Jenny v. Town of Mattapoisett,llegal services were rendered 
to the finance committee. General Laws, c. 40, §5 authorizes appro-
priations " ... for all other necessary charges arising in such town." 
The Court held that, after the services were rendered to the finance 
committee, the town could not raise and appropriate money to re-
imburse the committee for expenses they had incurred; even an at-
torney engaged by a board or officer authorized to engage one could 
§29.8. 1335 Mass. 156, 138 N.E.2d 766 (1956). 
2 See Higgins v. License Commissioners of Quincy, 308 Mass. 142, 145-146, 31 
N.E.2d 526, 529 (1941), and the cases cited therein. 
§29.9. 1335 Mass. 673, 141 N.E.2d 517 (1957). 
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not acquire a right to payment in the absence of an appropriation 
made before the employment or the doing of the work.2 
§29.10. Charitable trusts: Construction. The determination of 
the nature of the town's title in the town hall premises was involved 
in Town of Wakefield v. Attorney General.1 The preamble in the 
deed stated that the grantor was turning the realty over to the town 
with the desire and intent that it be devoted to certain public pur-
poses which were enumerated, but the preamble concluded by stating 
in the same sentence: "I desire to present the said land and building 
as a free and unrestricted gift to said Town." The Court ruled that 
the town did not take the conveyance subject to any trust or restriction 
since the deed did not contain any of the words usually associated 
with a condition or a restriction.2 The grantor in his deed merely 
named the uses that he desired or intended should be made of the 
premises but these words were neither apt nor appropriate to create 
a trust. 
§29.11. Police officers and firefighters: "Leave without loss of 
pay." A police officer in Votour v. City of Medford 1 brought an 
action under G.L., c. 41, §lllF 2 to recover wages due him while he 
was incapacitated for work on account of injuries sustained in the 
performance of his duty. The chief of police having testified that 
he could prepare a program of work which this plaintiff-officer could 
do, the city requested a ruling that the plaintiff should not be per-
mitted to recover because his incapacity was only partial and not 
total. The Court disposed of the requested ruling by stating that 
the statute makes no distinction between total and partial incapacity. 
The city apparently relied upon Amelio's Case S where the distinction 
between partial and total incapacity was made. However, the Amello 
case arose under the Workmen's Compensation Act 4 wherein a dif-
ference between total and partial incapacity is expressed and different 
compensation for each is provided. But the present statute provides 
only that if a police officer is incapacitated for duty he shall be granted 
leave without loss of pay for the period of incapacity. 
§29.12. Privilege not to incriminate oneself before Special Com-
mission. The petitioner in Corcoran v. Commonwealth,1 having been 
2 G.L., c. 44, §31; Lavelle v. Beverly, 330 Mass. 72, 73, 111 N.E.2d 687, 688 (1953). 
§29.l0. 1334 Mass. 632, 138 N.E.2d 197 (1956) . 
.IlLoomis v. City of Boston, 331 Mass. 129, 117 N.E.2d 539 (1954); Barker v. Bar-
rows, 138 Mass. 578 (1885); Rawson v. School District in Uxbridge, 7 Allen 125 
(Mass. 1863). 
§29.11. 1335 Mass. 403, 140 N.E.2d 177 (1957). 
2 General Laws, c. 41, §l11F provides: "Whenever a police officer ... is in-
capacitated for duty because of injury sustained in the performance of his duty 
without fault of his own, he shall be granted leave without loss of pay for the 
period of such incapacity; ... " 
B 320 Mass. 347, 69 N.E.2d 453 (1946). 
4 G.L., c. 152, §§34, 34A, 35. 
§29.12. 1335 Mass. 29, 138 N.E.2d 348 (1956). 
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found guilty of three separate contempts of court, brought a writ of 
error seeking to quash the three jail sentences imposed by the judge 
of the Superior Court. The judgments of contempt were made in a 
hearing upon an application to compel testimony filed by the Com-
mission in the Superior Court. At the court hearing, a stenographic 
transcript of the hearing before the Commission was introduced and 
showed that after the petitioner was sworn, he was asked questions 
by the Commission, and to each question the petitioner invoked the 
privilege under Article XII of the Declaration of Rights of the Mas-
sachusetts Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the federal Constitution. The first conviction for contempt, which 
arose out of proceedings before the Commission at which the peti-
tioner claimed the privilege, was quashed since, after invoking the 
privilege, the petitioner was not ordered by the Commission to 
answer any questions. The second conviction arose from petitioner'S 
failure to answer the same questions that were earlier asked by the 
Commission and now asked by the judge of the Superior Court. This 
contempt conviction was also quashed since Resolves of 1954, c. 80 
provides that "any justice of the superior court may ... compel ... the 
giving of testimony before said commission .... " This language mani-
festly did not embrace compelling the giving of testimony anywhere 
except before the Commission. The third contempt conviction was 
based upon the petitioner'S refusal to comply with the order of the 
Superior Court that he answer certain questions at a meeting of the 
Special Commission to be convened. Quite obviously this order 
sounded in futuro and was tantamount to an order to comply before 
compliance was possible. Therefore, this conviction was also not 
upheld.2 
2 See Crystal, Petitioner, 330 Mass. 583,116 N.E.2d 255 (1953). 
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